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REMARKS BY PROFESSOR JODY FREEMAN
* TO 
JAPANESE AMERICAN LAW SOCIETY 
September 12, 2004 
Tokyo 
First, let me thank you very much for inviting me to participate in this 
symposium along with my esteemed colleagues Professors Levin and 
Lubbers. In particular, I must thank Professor Takehisa Nakagawa, our 
host, and Professor Setuo Hiyama, who first contacted me to invite me on 
Professor Nakagawa’s behalf. They have both worked very hard in 
arranging this trip and in making us feel so welcome. I met Professor 
Hiyama many years ago when he was visiting the United States. We 
became friends and have kept in touch, and I am delighted to see him 
again. And I am very pleased to get to know Professor Nakagawa, whose 
work on Japanese administrative law I have read with admiration.  
I would like today to talk about some theoretical and practical 
developments in American administrative law, specifically the proposed 
move toward a system of “collaborative governance” in which public 
agencies and private parties participate jointly and cooperatively in the 
regulatory and administrative process. I should note, as Professor Levin 
talked about law reform and the role of the American Bar Association 
(ABA) and the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), 
that much of collaborative governance evolved from the bottom up—from 
agencies themselves, or stakeholders, or academics working through 
ACUS who were interested in introducing negotiation and dispute 
resolution into agency processes. ACUS, working with the ABA, then 
turned some of these collaborative experiments into law, but others are 
still not legislatively authorized. 
Most theories of administrative law in the United States seek to provide 
an account of why administrative agencies are legitimate in our 
constitutional democracy, because within the American constitutional 
order, their place is precarious. Let me explain. There is nothing in the 
American Constitution that specifically establishes a separate 
administrative state, certainly not one as elaborate and powerful as we now 
  *  Professor of Law, Harvard University. I am indebted to Professors Takehisa Nakagawa and 
Setuo Hiyama for inviting me to speak to the Japanese American Law Society, and to Professors Levin 
and Lubbers for being such delightful co-panelists. I am grateful to Taimie Bryant for helpful advice. 
These published remarks are a lightly edited version of the remarks I delivered in Tokyo. All errors are 
mine.  
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have, reaching into every sector of the economy and every facet of daily 
life. As many of you know, our Constitution divides power among three 
branches of government in an effort to provide checks and balances 
against concentrated power and also in an effort to prevent hasty action.
1 
The Constitution provides that Congress makes the law, that the executive 
implements that laws, and that the courts interpret the laws.
2 Executive 
power in the United States, that is, the power to implement the laws, is 
given by the Constitution to a unitary executive, meaning executive power 
resides in a single president.  
Yet administrative agencies, both so-called “independent” ones that are 
somewhat insulated from direct presidential control, and so-called 
“executive” ones, which directly answer to the President (and which must, 
therefore, perform the tricky balancing act of executing the President’s 
policies while also faithfully implementing statutes passed by Congress 
and delegated to the agencies for implementation), have flourished in the 
United States. And these agencies frequently integrate the very functions 
of rulemaking, implementation and adjudication (law-making, law 
execution and law interpretation) that are separated out in the Constitution 
to provide checks and balances. Agencies are not answerable directly to 
the electorate, because they are headed by political appointees, and yet 
they wield enormous power. This is the fundamental problem of American 
administrative law. My impression is that things are quite different in 
Japan, where the administrative state’s legitimacy and constitutional 
foundation are not questioned in this way. 
For a long time, administrative law scholars have wrestled with this 
problem of legitimacy and debated ways in which administrative power 
might be curbed and constrained. Not surprisingly for lawyers and legal 
scholars, judicial review has emerged as the crucial instrument for 
constraining administrative power. As a result, administrative law in the 
United States is largely devoted to studying the doctrines of judicial 
review of agency action and the theories of deference under which courts 
defer to agency judgments and interpretations. 
Yet the theory of collaborative governance that has emerged in recent 
years, and of which I am a proponent, is not so focused on courts, nor even 
on the fundamental problem of the administrative state’s legitimacy. It 
assumes that agencies will be constrained by judicial review, as well as by 
congressional oversight (which is very active in the United States) and 
 1.  See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III. 
 2.  Id. 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol83/iss6/5p1859 Freeman book pages.doc7/31/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  LESSONS FOR JAPAN 1861 
 
 
 
 
 
 
executive management through the Office of the President (principally, but 
not exclusively the office of Management and Budget). The problem from 
the perspective of collaborative governance is not excessive administrative 
discretion but poor strategies for good policy-making. As the system 
works now, regulation is not especially well-informed, not very timely, not 
very good at adapting to new information or changed conditions, not very 
comprehensive or long-term in its perspective, and highly adversarial. 
Regulation is perceived as an “Us versus Them” enterprise in which there 
are winners and losers. The government is pitted against regulated entities 
that tend to resist regulation and a variety of interest groups with their own 
agendas join most disputes on one side or the other. The regulatory 
process is widely viewed as a zero-sum game in which everyone guards 
their information jealously and in which positions are staked out and 
defended. 
Collaborative governance, at least as a theoretical ideal, is focused on 
reducing the conflict, time and expense of the regulatory process when 
possible, but even more importantly on generating sound, implementable, 
well-informed, and adaptable policy, with as much ongoing participation 
among affected parties as possible. The best known example of this in the 
United States is regulatory negotiation, a process by which an agency with 
rulemaking authority convenes a group of stakeholders, and other parties 
with an interest in the rule, for the purpose of negotiating its content. This 
is in contrast to a traditional rulemaking process called, “notice and 
comment” rulemaking, where the agency proposes a rule it wishes to 
promulgate; all interested parties file comments; the agency considers 
those comments and builds a record; and the agency then publishes the 
final rule which is frequently challenged in court. I realize that rulemaking 
is not as common in Japan but for many if not most American agencies, it 
is the dominant method of regulation. Many things that in Japan would be 
informally decided would go through the notice and comment process in 
the United States.  
Typically, prior to the agency’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
interested parties informally contact the agency to argue for their interests. 
Then, during the comment period itself, the parties that are the object of 
the regulation file voluminous amounts of material opposing the rule. Only 
a small percentage of this material tends to be constructive and helpful to 
the regulatory enterprise.
3 Much of it is defensive or unnecessary or 
 3.  See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 
1, 12–13 (1997) [hereinafter Freeman, Collaborative Governance]. 
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designed to slow and overwhelm the agency. Similarly, interest groups 
that support the regulation file voluminous material in favor of it, usually 
pressing the agency to go further than it is willing to go. But the parties do 
not engage directly with each other, and the process is not well designed to 
generate information that might actually improve the rule or result in a 
viable alternative. Instead, the purpose of comment is often to delay and 
obstruct the agency’s progress. The parties outside the agency have no 
responsibility for, or “ownership” of, the regulatory process.
4 
A negotiated rulemaking, by contrast, incorporates the parties into the 
rulemaking process on the front end.
5 Typically, a negotiation will include 
not only the directly affected regulated industry but also, for example, 
representatives from consumer, labor, and environmental groups whose 
members might be affected by the outcome and who would be in a 
position to challenge the rule in litigation. In successful regulatory 
negotiations, the agency establishes parameters, the parties negotiate and 
reach consensus, and all participants, including the agency, sign an 
agreement not to litigate if the agency implements the agreed upon rule.  
At its most ambitious, this collaborative approach seeks to reform not 
only rulemaking itself but also implementation and enforcement. Though 
it has not become part of the typical negotiated rulemaking process, one 
could imagine an approach in which the same parties that negotiated the 
rule would, as a group, continue to oversee its implementation, addressing 
difficulties as they arise.
6 As we all know issues arise during the 
implementation of a policy that no one anticipated. It could be useful, 
therefore, if the negotiating committee were ongoing, so that it could serve 
as a forum for resolving these matters.  
In theory, trust ought to improve regulatory relationships. Once players 
have become familiar with each other and have built trust, implementation 
and enforcement should operate more smoothly. We do not have good 
data on how regulatory negotiations affect implementation and 
enforcement, so the positive potential of negotiated rulemaking remains 
somewhat speculative. But as an approach, it represents a departure from 
the traditional adversarial process. Of course even when it uses negotiated 
rulemaking, the government still retains the right to take a more aggressive 
approach in the end. Unlike in Japan, many American agencies have their 
own enforcement power, and can impose administrative penalties directly. 
But in a collaborative system, agencies would first ask how they might 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 34. 
 6.  See id. at 72. 
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facilitate and encourage greater compliance. Instead of assuming an 
oppositional stance from the outset, unilateral enforcement would be a last 
resort.
7  
Let me offer another example of a collaborative experiment besides 
regulatory negotiation, this time in the implementation process. The 
example is drawn from environmental law, a field in which collaborative 
experiments have flourished.
8 Typically, firms that pollute the 
environment must apply for and obtain permits issued by the 
environmental agencies responsible for implementing environmental laws. 
These permits contain limits on, among other tings, the amount of air and 
water pollution the firms can emit. Usually the limits are performance 
standards that require firms to install pollution control technology. 
Traditionally, applying for a permit is a highly adversarial process in 
which the applicant submits documents and information, and the agency 
unilaterally decides the terms of the permit, after interpreting the relevant 
regulations. Typically, there is a back and forth between the applicant and 
the agency, but it is not a “collaborative” process in which they share 
information voluntarily and assist each other as if they had a common 
goal.  
Traditional permitting can be very costly and time consuming. For 
example, in a typical case, every process change within a firm that 
increases pollution would trigger a separate and lengthy permit 
application. For industries that make process changes frequently, like the 
computer chip industry, applying for a permit for every change can slow 
the firm’s ability to get new products to market (in this case computer 
chips, which turn over, I believe, something like every 18 months).
9  
In the 1990s, the Environmental Protection Agency adopted a program 
called “Project XL,” which was an experimental approach to issuing 
permits using a more collaborative model. Under Project XL, an agency 
negotiates permits with individual firms or industry sectors and includes 
other stakeholders (like local community and environmental groups) in the 
process as well.
10 The goal of the negotiation is to ensure that the firm 
achieves greater environmental protection than it would achieved under 
 7.  Id. 
  8.  For an example of such a collaborative experiment, see id. at 57–61 (describing the Berry 
Corporation’s experience). 
 9.  See id. at 61–66 (describing Intel Corporation’s experience with collaborative environmental 
regulation). 
  10.  “XL” stands for “Excellence in Leadership.” See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 
60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23, 1995); see also Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 3, at 
55. 
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the traditional regulations and the normal permit process. The idea behind 
XL was that if the agency shows some regulatory flexibility the firm will 
produce better environmental performance than it would otherwise be 
legally obligated to achieve. Using this more collaborative approach, the 
bilateral nature of traditional permitting process converts into a multi-
lateral process involving more stakeholders.
11  
In a typical XL project, the EPA might grant pre-approval of process 
changes in a single streamlined permit obviating the need for multiple 
permits for each change. The agency might authorize the firm to do things 
they otherwise could not do under the regulations. For example, the firm 
might be allowed to trade reductions of one kind of pollutant for increases 
in another, or reduce pollution in one medium (say water pollution) in 
exchange for increases in another medium (say air pollution).
12 The 
agency is prepared to grant this flexibility only where staff believe there is 
a net benefit to the environment. Interestingly, XL negotiations do not 
produce legally enforceable agreements, but instead culminate in a 
detailed, written document known as a “Final Project Agreement” in 
which the agency and the firm, together with other stakeholders, make 
mutual commitments about what they will do.
13 The permit looks more 
like a contract. 
Let me offer a third and final example. A collaborative approach can 
also be useful in managing natural resources like watersheds, forests and 
public lands, where conflicts frequently arise because a variety of 
stakeholders have a claim on the resource. The best known example of 
collaborative resource management is something called “habitat 
conservation planning.”
14 This is a negotiated environmental planning 
process involving multiple parties, aimed at allowing development and 
resource extraction to occur, while at the same time protecting endangered 
species and ensuring the viability of fragile ecosystems.  
To explain the process requires a bit of background. Under an 
American law called the Endangered Species Act, it is prohibited to “take” 
(meaning to kill or harm) a species that is officially listed by the agency as 
“endangered” (to be endangered means the species is at risk of 
 11.  See Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, The Risks and the Advantages of Agency 
Discretion: Evidence from EPA’s Project XL, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 67, 84–85 (1998/99). 
 12.  See Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 155, 193–94 (2000) 
[hereinafter Freeman, The Contracting State]. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See generally J.B. Ruhl, How to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of 
Endangered Species Act “HCP” Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 345 (1999) 
[hereinafter Ruhl, “HCP” Permits]. 
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extinction).
15 Many activities, both public and private—from building 
dams to cutting timber, to developing residential housing—would not be 
able to go forward if they destroyed essential habitat for such species. This 
would amount to a prohibited “take.” 
However, the same law also provides for a special permit process under 
which parties may “take” endangered species, as long as they negotiate an 
agreement under which the effects on the endangered species might be 
mitigated. The process by which this is done is called a “Habitat 
Conservation Plan” (HCP)
16 As with negotiated rulemaking, here, a 
government agency (the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service) convenes all the 
relevant stakeholders, including, for example, the permit applicant, the 
state and federal agencies in charge of fish and wildlife, local community 
groups and environmental groups, and local governments. And together, 
they negotiate a comprehensive plan.
17 Unlike negotiated rulemaking, 
however, the product is a plan for managing a complex area over time, 
rather than a rule an agency will promulgate. The HCP ideally represents 
an attempt to take a more holistic and preventive approach to activities that 
are likely to have an adverse environmental effect.  
The advantage of the process is that it might go beyond what the 
Endangered Species Act would normally accomplish.
18 Under this law, 
one simply cannot do anything to harm a species that is listed as 
endangered. Yet this protection only applies once that species is literally 
on the brink of extinction. It is an “all or nothing” approach. Once listed, 
the species is fully protected, but before that it is not. The HCP process 
allows participants to be more proactive and comprehensive. It enables 
them to protect other species that are not yet on the brink of extinction and 
to protect aspects of the environment that are not directly related to the 
species. One can see the similarity here with Project XL in that the 
flexibility of negotiation gives the agency an opportunity to perhaps 
regulate beyond its traditional reach—to regulate activities and issues that 
it normally does not regulate, in exchange for giving flexibility in other 
areas.  
These Habitat Conservation plans can provide for setting aside land, 
mitigating environmental harms, and taking a wide variety of measures for 
ecosystem protection that are very costly. They can cover from one acre to 
hundreds of thousands of acres and last anywhere from 5 to 100 years. 
 15.  See Endangered Species Act 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2000). 
 16.  See generally Ruhl, “HCP” Permits, supra note 14. 
 17.  Freeman,  The Contracting State, supra note 12, at 195. 
 18.  Id. 
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This is far more than the statute’s simple prohibition on “taking” a species 
could ever accomplish. And the success of HCPs relies extensively on 
expertise that lies outside of government.
19 For instance, some 
environmental groups with experience in land conservation play key roles 
as managers and monitors of these plans over the long term. Indeed, this is 
a premise of collaborative governance: that knowledge, information, and 
expertise resides outside of government. So private actors may play new 
roles in a collaborative approach. 
So too might public agencies play new roles. The HCP process, just 
like Project XL and regulatory negotiation, illustrates this.
20 For example, 
the agency in charge of the HCP process has tried to give permit 
applicants an incentive to negotiate plans by issuing a policy stating that 
once a Habitat Conservation Plan is finalized, the agency will not add 
more burdens later on. If the applicant abides by the terms of the 
agreement (for example, setting aside so much land for species, spending 
so much money mitigating the environmental impact of the development, 
and monitoring the health of the ecosystem), the applicant has fulfilled its 
responsibility. This seems similar to what one would expect in a standard 
private contract between two private parties. The purpose of the “no 
surprise” policy is to give the permit applicant some certainty about the 
“deal.” But in this case, it is government giving an assurance to a private 
party, and it seems to limit government’s traditional regulatory power in 
the future.  
This raises important questions about how much a government both 
can and should bind its own regulatory power through agreement. It raises 
the even more fundamental question about the extent to which the 
relationships between agencies and private parties can or should mirror 
those in the private sector. This brings us, of course to the most difficult 
question of all, which is, what is the appropriate role for government in 
regulation?  
The central idea behind collaborative governance, as a normative 
theory, is to convert a top-down, hierarchical approach to governance—in 
which an agency dictates requirements, and private parties resist 
compliance—into a more horizontal, multi-lateral approach in which 
public and private parties engage in pro-active problem-solving, working 
together to design and implement a regulatory regime.
21  
 19.  See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 553–54 
(2000). 
 20.  See Freeman, The Contracting State, supra note 12, at 208. 
 21.  Freeman,  Collaborative Governance, supra note 3, at 27. 
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Naturally, of course, not everything in these negotiations can be up for 
grabs: the agency must still set parameters within which consensus will be 
achieved. The agency maintains its role as the representative of the larger 
public interest and remains constrained by the limits of relevant statutes. 
In other words, there are still legal, and of course political, constraints on 
agency flexibility. Yet the agency takes on new roles in collaborative 
governance as a convenor of affected parties, a facilitator of problem-
solving, and as a partner throughout the regulatory process as agreements 
are implemented.
22  
Moving toward collaboration would present a new set of challenges for 
administrative agencies in the American context. It highlights the need to 
develop a different self-conception—a different “identity” if you will—
among agency officials.
23 Collaboration is something for which agency 
staff are not especially well-trained and toward which many of them are 
not favorably disposed. Many regulatory agencies in the United States 
have developed internal cultures that are quite adversarial. They are used 
to being regulators, not facilitators, conveners, and partners. They are not 
typically trained, for example, in dispute resolution. This is understandable 
of course; regulators are trained to set standards, and enforcement staff to 
punish violators. Still, the lack of exposure to alternative approaches is 
striking. 
Collaborative initiatives take time to develop. They depend on the 
cultivation of relationships and the development of norms, along with 
training in techniques like negotiation, something that I suspect is very 
much a part of the Japanese administrative process and second nature in 
Japanese society. But this is relatively foreign to the American process. 
Americans are, I dare say, notoriously impatient (I say this as a Canadian 
having lived in the U.S. most of my adult life). I say this only half 
facetiously—American culture is “muscular” compared to others. 
negotiation and accommodation are not dominant reactions to conflict, I 
have found. But more important than this, perhaps, are the political 
imperatives that shape agency behavior. Political appointees who serve 
only a short time want to claim quick and clear successes. Collaborative 
initiatives are complicated, time consuming and not always successful, at 
least not in the short-term. All of this is to say that because of incentives 
peculiar to the American system, and because of unique aspects of 
 22.  Id. at 31–33. 
 23.  See id. at 13–14. 
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American culture, there are many obstacles to collaborative governance 
within American administrative agencies themselves.
24 
As a theoretical and normative idea, collaborative governance 
represents an alternative to the traditional adversarialism that characterizes 
American regulation, implementation and enforcement. As a practical 
matter, adopting a collaborative approach may improve both the quality 
and legitimacy of the regulatory process. To assess whether the theory 
works in practice, however, more experimentation is needed along with 
monitoring and empirical evaluation. This is developing, but it is going 
slowly. For example, Professor Langbein and I have written an article 
assessing the empirical performance of regulatory negotiation.
25 Our 
assessment was based on a two-part study that she conducted with another 
academic, Neil Kerwin. In the first stage of the study, participants in a set 
of negotiated rulemakings were interviewed extensively to learn what they 
thought of the process.
26 In the second stage, Kerwin and Langbein 
evaluated a set of negotiated rules against comparable rules produced in 
the traditional notice-and-comment process.
27 The study shows that the 
participants in negotiated rulemaking are more satisfied with negotiated 
rules; that they think the negotiated rules will be easier to implement; that 
they learned much more than they had in the past in the traditional 
adversarial process; and that they think the rules they produced were of 
superior quality to what the agency would have produced on its own.
28  
It may be, as others have argued, that negotiating rules is as costly as 
the traditional approach, especially if it is necessary to subsidize the less 
wealthy interest groups in order to ensure that they participate. And of 
course negotiations can take a long time, usually between a year and two 
years but sometimes longer. We believe, however, that time spent on the 
front end is likely to save time on implementation on the back end; at 
least, this is certainly worth looking into.
29 We concede that negotiating 
rules will not necessarily eliminate the threat of litigation. There will still 
be litigation in some cases. There is always a risk that some parties will 
negotiate and then, if they do not get all they want, turn around and sue. 
Yet if there is to be a lawsuit, the fact that the challenged rule was 
 24.  See generally id. at 67–82. 
  25.  Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60 (2000).  
 26.  Id. at 79. 
 27.  Id. at 105–06. 
 28.  Id. at 121–22. 
 29.  Id. 
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negotiated can narrow the areas of conflict, reducing the burden on both 
the parties and the reviewing court.  
Still, we believe that the negotiation process can reduce the likelihood 
of litigation. For example, signing an agreement that parties will not 
litigate once they agree to the consensus rule at least creates a norm 
against such behavior. Moreover, doing so would be risky: if parties do 
this, they will not be regarded as reliable negotiating parties in the future. 
So there is a strong possibility that those who wish to be repeat players 
(including corporations, industry trade associations, as well as 
environmental, labor, and consumer groups) will behave reliably. There 
may also be litigation, and understandably, if the agency departs from the 
consensus rule and promulgates something different. In those cases, we 
can expect court challenges. Still, in terms of the quality of the rule and its 
acceptability to the major affected parties, we feel that negotiated 
rulemaking is comparatively superior.
30  
I should hasten to add that there is a lively debate about this in the 
United States, with some scholars arguing that negotiated rules and other 
collaborative experiments like those I have discussed here, are not 
legitimate because they amount to “deals” struck among insiders. This is a 
criticism that I have heard about the Japanese system as well, and it is a 
reminder that we need to erect safeguards against the possibility of agency 
capture by the most powerful interests. The careful design of the process, 
to ensure that it includes a variety of representatives from different interest 
groups, is crucial. And the agency must understand and actively play its 
role on behalf of the larger public interest. The agency should not be a 
passive arbiter, acceding to any deal as long as parties agree. In other 
words, agreement itself should not be a sign of success. Rather, the 
question is, does the rule, permit, plan, or agreement being negotiated 
advance the policy articulated by Congress in the relevant statute and will 
it accomplish the regulatory goal? Judicial review can play an important 
role here, ensuring that the procedural safeguards governing the 
negotiation have been observed. I will return to this when I discuss the 
possibilities for collaborative governance in Japan. 
In addition to empirical work on negotiated rulemaking, there are also 
some empirical studies of Project XL. Some believe that Project XL is 
largely successful—that it speeds up the permit process for industries that 
need faster approval for process changes, and also results in a net gain for 
environmental protection. Yet others believe that XL amounts to private 
 30.  Id. 
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“sweetheart” deals with corporations.
31 Critics claim that the process is not 
truly balanced but instead dominated by industry, and they believe that 
regulatory “flexibility” simply means weaker regulation. A final objection 
is that Project XL is beyond the authority of the EPA because no statute 
explicitly authorizes agencies to pursue this approach.
32  
So while collaborative governance remains promising as a theory, and 
has been used with some success in practice, it is not without its critics. It 
is not clear yet just how much stakeholders and agencies wish to embrace 
it. And it is not clear how generalizable it will be beyond the contexts in 
which it is currently being tried. For example, it would be important to do 
research on collaborative efforts in financial regulation and other sectors to 
know if it can be successful more generally. 
As a cultural matter, collaborative governance seems much more 
Japanese than American. I say this because of its relatively greater reliance 
on informality and its relative lack of adversarialism. A collaborative 
approach seems consistent with the historical reliance in Japan on informal 
guidance (gyosei shido) and the principle of negotiating to arrive at 
“voluntariness.”
33 By relatively greater reliance on informality I do not 
mean, however, to suggest a lack of lawfulness or legal authority for 
government action. I mean instead two things. First, that a negotiated or 
problem-solving approach requires a government agency to have some 
flexibility and discretion, and also to be more adaptable when it plays the 
unfamiliar role of negotiating partner than it might otherwise be when 
simply dictating regulation. This is quite different from a hierarchical 
approach in which government simply promulgates rules after passively 
receiving input from parties in a process that everyone regards as a zero-
sum game.  
Second, collaborative governance is somewhat informal in that, 
frequently, it relies on agreements that are more akin to contract than to 
traditional regulation. For example, while negotiated rulemaking 
ultimately produces a promulgated “rule,” the underlying basis for that 
rule is really a rather informal agreement struck between the parties. 
Similarly, the negotiated approach to permitting in Project XL relies on a 
“final project agreement” (FPA) which looks more like a contract than a 
traditional permit. The FPA contains the mutual commitments made by the 
 31.  See Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from 
Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 141 (1998). 
 32.  See generally Bradford Mank, The Environmental Protection Agency’s Project XL and Other 
Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1998). 
 33.  See CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2003). 
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government agency, the regulated firm, and other interested parties such as 
local community and environmental groups. Only after the FPA is signed 
does the agency issue a traditional permit to the company. This is also true 
of habitat conservation plans, which proceed as structured contract 
negotiations even though they ultimately result in a permit. The 
negotiation occurs among a host of actors: the developer, federal and state 
agencies, as well as environmental and local community groups.  
To be more accurate, however, such an “agreement-based” approach to 
regulation seems to be something of a hybrid between the Japanese 
reliance on “guidance” and “voluntariness,” and the traditional American 
system of more formalized procedures.
34 Indeed, the best way to describe 
many collaborative experiments is as a mix of formal and informal agency 
action. 
In some instances, collaborative governance is highly formalized. For 
example, remember, the habitat conservation planning process is 
authorized and structured by the Endangered Species Act. And regulatory 
negotiation which was at first experimental, was subsequently authorized 
and structured by Congress in a statute called the Negotiated Rulemaking 
Act.
35 Indeed, this statutory reform was proposed by ACUS and supported 
by the ABA. This is part of what Professor Levin has called “the era of 
adaptation in administrative law reform.” Professor Lubbers will explain 
more about this law, so I will not cover it in detail. Suffice it to say that it 
requires all regulatory negotiations conducted by federal agencies to be 
open to the public; that minutes of meetings be kept; that consensus rules 
still be circulated for public comment; and that any resulting rule 
promulgated by the agency, regardless of the consensus reached, can still 
be challenged in court and subjected to legal review. Importantly, courts 
are not to grant consensus rules any greater deference than they do 
traditional rules.  
So there are many safeguards that accompany the collaborative 
approaches that have been formally authorized. Indeed, for some, there are 
too many. That is, formalizing collaboration and spelling out detailed 
procedures that must be observed is thought by some to interfere with the 
creativity and flexibility that a negotiated approach ideally affords. Of 
course, the purpose of the procedures is to make the process transparent 
and therefore accountable. This raises a potential trade-off between 
accountability to the public and a focus on coming to creative agreements 
 34.  Id.  
  35.  Pub. L. No. 104-320 (1996). 
Wash U Law Repositoryp1859 Freeman book pages.doc7/31/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
1872  WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [ VOL. 83:1859 
 
 
 
 
that will be, among other things, implementable. Greater formality can add 
expense and delay as well.  
In any event, to say that collaborative governance is relatively informal 
is merely to say that the negotiation process itself is relatively flexible and 
meant to promote “thinking out of the box,” and also that the final 
agreements among the parties are not, unless they are incorporated into a 
rule or permit, independently legally enforceable. They are more like 
informal “voluntary” agreements, with the threat of traditional regulation 
lurking in the background. 
At the same time, it is also true that some experiments in collaboration 
are not authorized by statute. These are closer still to the informality of the 
Japanese administrative process because they rely on an agency’s 
assumption that it has the power to engage in a more collaborative process 
as part of its broadly conceived enforcement discretion. Project XL falls 
into this category. The EPA traditionally has considerable discretion to 
determine the content of permits and to enforce them as the agency sees 
fit. Cast this way, negotiating an XL agreement is perfectly within the 
agency’s traditional authority. And courts are wary of interfering with an 
agency’s enforcement discretion. 
Similarly, by relative lack of adversarialism I do not mean to suggest 
that the parties in a collaborative process have no interests or positions. 
They would not willingly join a negotiated enterprise unless they had 
something to gain. Without a robust regulatory process in the background, 
they have no incentive to negotiate. Obviously, collaboration requires a 
shadow legal default against which the negotiating occurs. Nor do I mean 
to suggest that the traditional regulatory system is completely devoid of 
negotiation. The rulemaking process, the permit application process and 
the enforcement/settlement process involve a great deal of back-and-forth 
between the agency and the affected parties. Still, the difference between 
this and an explicitly collaborative approach is that the former reats the 
“parties” as outsiders to decisionmaking whereas the latter treats them as 
partners who might share in decisionmaking from the choice of regulatory 
standard through implementation. Without the right incentives, and 
without the potential for “win-win” solutions, collaboration would not 
work. 
In a way, all of this may sound familiar to you. It seems that 
collaboration already, to a significant extent, characterizes the Japanese 
approach to regulation. From what I have learned of the Japanese system, 
agencies rely heavily on negotiation, persuasion, and cajoling, all of which 
are aimed at arriving at an eventual consensus between regulator and 
regulated. So to suggest a normative model based on negotiation and 
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consensus perhaps would not strike any of you as unusual. But it is quite 
controversial in the United States.  
Yet, it may be precisely because collaborative governance is so 
superficially compatible with Japanese administrative law and culture that 
it would not  be suitable for transplantation from America, at least not 
without some very significant adaptation. If I understand the Japanese 
system correctly, administrative agencies tend to use administrative 
guidance as their primary regulatory tool. Professor Goodman’s estimate, 
in his article on the rule of law in Japan, was that 80% of administrative 
activity in Japan is through the use of guidance.
36 And I know that 
Professor Nakagawa has written about how Japanese lawyers understand 
guidance. My impression is that guidance is best described as a process of 
negotiation and consultation, the aim of which is voluntary agreement. But 
of course because guidance is not the same as a “disposition,” it cannot be 
subject to judicial review in the Japanese system.  
In addition, if again I am correct, the Japanese system is characterized 
by two other features that are different from the United States: (1) very 
broad discretion to interpret and expand legislative mandates beyond 
specifically delegated “duties” to more amorphous and less easily cabined 
functions; and (2) virtually no serious fear of being reversed by courts 
because of the difficulty of access to courts for plaintiffs, and because 
principles of strong deference apply when courts do review agency 
decisions. Furthermore, there is no presumption of reviewability.
37 
Collaborative governance (both the ideal theory and the less than ideal 
practical experiments I have described), has developed in the United States 
in a particular context and against a background that is quite different from 
the situation in Japan. The American administrative system is 
characterized by a highly proceduralized notice and comment process for 
rulemaking; sophisticated interest groups (representing not only industry 
but also consumers, environment, and labor) who participate extensively 
in every stage of rulemaking; fairly low standing thresholds for accessing 
judicial review; a presumption of reviewability; and flexible standards of 
deference that allow, at least in some cases, quite vigorous judicial review 
of agency action. When collaborative governance emerged, it was against 
the background of this traditional regime becoming highly adversarial, 
slow, and burdensome, so much so that one scholar called the rulemaking 
 36.  See GOODMAN, supra note 33. 
 37.  Id. 
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process “ossified.”
38 Collaborative governance was intended to be at least 
a partial solution to these problems.  
Collaborative governance may be less suitable in Japan, however, 
because it seems that Japanese administrative law is not afflicted with the 
same problems. Ironically, to make collaboration function effectively in 
Japan, it might be necessary to build some additional formality back into 
the system. Collaboration requires procedural safeguards if it is to work 
well. These include judicial review to oversee and check the process, and 
sophisticated interest group participation to ensure that negotiations do not 
become bilateral deals.  
 38.  Thomas  O.  McGarity,  Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 1385 (1992). 
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